ISIS Craft-Produced 120mm Mortar Round
1. Overview
The ISIS 120mm Mortar Round is a craft-produced (improvised) mortar projectile manufactured on an industrial scale by the Islamic State (IS/ISIS/ISIL/Daesh) within occupied territories in Iraq and Syria, primarily between 2014 and 2017. Unlike typical improvised weapons, ISIS mortar rounds were manufactured through a centrally controlled, standardized production system that Conflict Armament Research (CAR) assessed as comparable in organization to state-level munitions production. Production facilities in Mosul, Tel Afar, and other cities produced mortar rounds in the tens of thousands, using cast scrap metal bodies, improvised explosive fills from commercially procured chemical precursors, and a standardized universal fuze system. These munitions represent a significant shift in non-state actor weapons capability and remain a major UXO concern across liberated territories in Iraq and Syria.
2. Country/Bloc of Origin
- Manufacturer: Islamic State (IS/ISIS/ISIL/Daesh) — non-state armed group
- Production Locations: Primarily in Mosul, Tel Afar, Hawija, Raqqa, and other cities under ISIS control in Iraq and Syria
- Time Period: Mass production documented from approximately 2014 through 2017; production ceased as territory was lost to coalition and government forces
- Production Scale: Conflict Armament Research documented over 5,000 mortar rounds and rockets in various stages of production at six facilities in eastern Mosul alone during a six-day investigation in November 2016; total production across all facilities is estimated in the tens of thousands
3. Ordnance Class
- Type: Mortar projectile (craft-produced / improvised)
- Role: High-explosive fragmentation — indirect fire against personnel, structures, and area targets
- Delivery Method: Muzzle-loaded, fired from both captured conventional mortar tubes and craft-produced mortar launch tubes
- Classification Note: While technically “improvised,” the standardization and quality control of ISIS mortar production led CAR to describe it as “industrial” rather than “quasi-industrial” — a significant distinction from typical insurgent craft-produced munitions
4. Ordnance Family / Nomenclature
- No Formal Military Designation: ISIS mortar rounds do not carry standard military nomenclature; they are identified by caliber and manufacturing characteristics
- Caliber Variants: ISIS produced mortar rounds in several calibers, with 120mm being the most common heavy mortar caliber; they also produced 60mm, 81mm, and a distinctive ~119.5mm variant (slightly undersized to fit repurposed steel pipe launch tubes)
- Labeling: ISIS applied printed labels to packaging and components with production dates, lot information, and component descriptions in Arabic; these labels followed a standardized format across production facilities
- Universal Fuze: A distinctive feature of ISIS ordnance production was the development of a single universal fuze design used across multiple weapon types including mortars, rockets, and bomblets
- Identification Terminology: Commonly referred to as “ISIS craft-produced mortar,” “IS-manufactured 120mm mortar,” or “Daesh mortar round”
5. Hazards
- Primary Hazards: Blast and fragmentation; the cast metal body produces fragments upon detonation of the improvised explosive fill
- Explosive Fill: Manufactured from commercially procured chemical precursors, primarily potassium nitrate-based mixtures and other improvised explosive compositions; the fill is less predictable in sensitivity and performance than military-grade explosives
- Unpredictable Performance: As craft-produced munitions, ISIS mortars exhibit greater variability in quality and reliability than factory-manufactured ordnance. This unpredictability extends to:
- Fuze sensitivity and arming reliability
- Explosive fill composition and sensitivity
- Structural integrity of the cast metal body
- Ballistic consistency
- Fuze Hazards: The universal fuze design used by ISIS is particularly concerning as it may incorporate components from 12-gauge shotgun shells as initiators, combined with improvised detonator assemblies. The arming and safety characteristics of these fuzes are not well-documented and may vary between production batches
- UXO Considerations: Large quantities of ISIS-produced mortar rounds remain as UXO across liberated areas of Iraq and Syria. The improvised nature of these rounds makes them particularly unpredictable as UXO — dud rates may be higher than conventional munitions, and the sensitivity of unfired rounds in storage is uncertain
- IED Conversion: ISIS-produced mortar rounds have been documented as components of IEDs and booby traps left behind in liberated areas
- Chemical Precursor Hazards: Production facilities and storage areas may contain bulk quantities of chemical precursors (potassium nitrate, aluminum powder, grease, and others) that present additional hazards
6. Key Identification Features
- Caliber: Nominally 120mm; some variants measured at approximately 119.5mm (slightly undersized to fit repurposed steel pipe launch tubes)
- Body Construction: Cast from melted scrap metal in improvised foundries; surface finish is noticeably rougher and less uniform than factory-manufactured munitions
- Fin Assembly: Metal tail fin assembly; may be welded or pressed; typically cruder in appearance than conventional mortar fin assemblies
- Fuze: Improvised universal fuze; may incorporate visible shotgun shell components; appearance differs significantly from standard military mortar fuzes
- Surface Finish: Rough cast surface; may be painted or unpainted; casting defects (voids, inclusions, rough seams) may be visible
- Markings/Labels: May have Arabic-language printed labels on packaging or directly on components; labels typically include production date and lot information
- Weight: Approximately 15–16 kg (comparable to conventional 120mm mortar bombs, though variability is expected)
- Overall Appearance: Attempts to mimic the general profile of conventional 120mm mortar rounds (teardrop body with tail fins) but with noticeably lower manufacturing quality; casting quality, symmetry, and surface finish are key differentiators from factory production
7. Fuzing Mechanisms
- Fuze Type: Craft-produced universal fuze — a distinctive ISIS innovation designed to work across multiple weapon types (mortars, rockets, bomblets)
- Design Philosophy: ISIS developed a single fuze design for use across its entire ordnance production program, simplifying manufacturing logistics and training
- Initiator Components: Reports document the use of 12-gauge shotgun shell primers as impact-sensitive initiators within the fuze assembly
- Arming Mechanism: Details of the arming mechanism are not fully documented in open sources; the fuze likely incorporates some form of setback arming, but the reliability and safety characteristics are uncertain
- Safety Features: Unlike conventional military fuzes, ISIS craft-produced fuzes likely have minimal or no bore-safety features; this means rounds may be armed or partially armed at rest, significantly increasing handling and UXO hazards
- Detonator: Improvised detonator assembly designed to initiate the main explosive charge
- Critical Safety Concern: The lack of standardized safety mechanisms means that ISIS mortar rounds — whether fired and unfunctioned (UXO) or unfired rounds found in storage — should be treated as having unknown and potentially unpredictable sensitivity states
8. History of Development and Use
ISIS’s weapons production program evolved from basic improvised explosive device (IED) manufacturing into what Conflict Armament Research described as an “industrial” production system between 2014 and 2017. This evolution coincided with ISIS’s control of major urban centers and industrial infrastructure in Iraq and Syria.
The transition from improvised to industrial-scale production was documented through CAR’s field investigations, which accompanied Iraqi and Kurdish forces during the liberation of Mosul, Tel Afar, and other cities. In Mosul, investigators found manufacturing workshops repurposed from civilian buildings and markets, where the narrow alleyways and overhead tarps designed for market commerce provided effective concealment from aerial surveillance.
Production facilities included foundries for casting mortar bodies from melted scrap metal, assembly lines for fuze production, explosive mixing and filling stations, and quality control and packaging operations. The level of standardization was remarkable for a non-state actor: printed labels, numbered lot systems, wooden pallets for transport, and labeled plastic bags for component kits all suggested centralized management with formal directives and specifications.
The universal fuze concept — one fuze design for multiple weapon types — was a significant engineering achievement that simplified production and logistics. However, it also meant that a single design flaw or quality control failure could affect munitions across the entire production program.
ISIS mortar rounds were used extensively in the defense of Mosul, Raqqa, and other cities, fired from both captured conventional mortar systems and craft-produced launch tubes. The high rate of production (thousands of rounds documented in facilities under active production as late as October 2016, as Iraqi forces began the Mosul offensive) demonstrates the speed and scale of the program.
After the territorial defeat of ISIS, vast quantities of these mortar rounds remained in abandoned production facilities, defensive positions, storage sites, and as UXO across the battlefield. They represent a persistent explosive hazard for returning civilian populations and clearance personnel. Additionally, the technical knowledge developed through this production program has potential proliferation implications for other non-state actors.
9. Technical Specifications
| Parameter | Specification |
|---|---|
| Caliber | ~120mm (some variants ~119.5mm) |
| Type | Craft-produced HE mortar round |
| Body Material | Cast scrap metal (improvised foundry production) |
| Explosive Fill | Improvised compositions from commercial precursors (potassium nitrate-based) |
| Estimated Weight | ~15–16 kg (variable) |
| Fuze Type | Craft-produced universal fuze (impact-initiated) |
| Fuze Initiator | Reported use of 12-gauge shotgun shell components |
| Fin Assembly | Metal (welded or pressed construction) |
| Production Scale | Tens of thousands (estimated) |
| Production Period | ~2014–2017 |
| Compatible Launch Systems | Captured conventional 120mm mortar systems; craft-produced steel pipe launch tubes |
| Quality Standard | Variable; rough cast finish; higher dimensional variability than conventional munitions |
10. Frequently Asked Questions
Q: What makes ISIS mortar production different from typical insurgent improvised weapons? A: The key distinction is scale, standardization, and quality control. Typical insurgent improvised weapons are built individually or in small batches with available materials. ISIS established centralized production facilities with standardized designs, printed labels, numbered lot systems, quality control inspections, and organized logistics including wooden pallets and labeled component kits. CAR assessed this as “industrial” rather than “improvised” production — a capability more typically associated with state-level actors.
Q: Why are ISIS mortar rounds particularly dangerous as UXO? A: Several factors compound the UXO hazard: the improvised explosive fill may have unpredictable sensitivity characteristics; the craft-produced fuzes likely lack conventional bore-safety features and may be in uncertain arming states; the cast metal bodies may have structural defects (voids, inclusions) that affect behavior unpredictably; and quality control, while standardized for ISIS, does not approach the reliability of conventional military munitions. The unknown sensitivity state of both fuze and fill make these items especially hazardous.
Q: How were the explosive fills for ISIS mortar rounds produced? A: ISIS procured commercial chemical precursors in bulk — including potassium nitrate (fertilizer), aluminum powder, and various binding agents — through supply networks primarily routed through Turkey. These precursors were mixed in production facilities to create explosive compositions that, while less powerful and predictable than military-grade explosives, were adequate for mortar applications. The procurement chain was extensively documented by CAR.
Q: Why did ISIS produce slightly undersized (~119.5mm) mortar rounds? A: Some ISIS mortar rounds were manufactured at approximately 119.5mm rather than the standard 120mm caliber. This was because ISIS used repurposed steel pipes as mortar launch tubes, and the available pipe dimensions did not precisely match the 120mm caliber specification. ISIS adapted their projectile dimensions to fit the available launch tubes — a practical manufacturing decision that illustrates the relationship between available materials and weapon design.
Q: What is the universal fuze concept? A: ISIS developed a single fuze design intended to function across multiple weapon types, including mortar rounds, rockets, and bomblets. This simplified manufacturing (only one fuze production line needed) and logistics (fuzes were interchangeable across weapons types). However, a single design optimized for versatility may compromise performance in specific applications, and any quality defects affect the entire production program.
Q: What should EOD/clearance personnel know about encountering ISIS mortar rounds? A: Treat all ISIS craft-produced mortar rounds as having unknown and potentially extreme sensitivity. The fuze may lack bore-safety features; the explosive fill may have unpredictable sensitivity; and structural defects in the cast body may affect behavior. Standard military EOD procedures for similar-caliber conventional mortar rounds may need to be adapted. Additionally, be aware that ISIS mortar rounds have been documented as components of secondary IEDs and booby traps in liberated areas. Area clearance should anticipate both conventional UXO and deliberate trap configurations.
⚠️ SAFETY WARNING: All ordnance should be considered dangerous until proven safe by qualified EOD or demining personnel. Never approach, handle, or attempt to move suspected UXO. Report all findings to appropriate military or civilian authorities immediately. ISIS craft-produced munitions present unique hazards due to unpredictable manufacturing quality and unknown sensitivity states. This material is for educational and identification training purposes only.